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ROBINSON-PATMAN CURTAILMENTS ON DISTRIBUTION
INNOVATION: A STATUS SOUGHT FOR
FUNCTIONAL DISCOUNTS*
THE increasingly complex character of American economy has created
powerful incentives for new methods of distribution and marketing.' First, as
costs of distribution become a more significant part of total costs, producers
seek the economic advantages of more efficient distributive methods. 2 In other
instances, new marketing techniques-combining distributive services with the
supply of goods-have become important competitive devices.3 Since many
of the new methods adopted are, on their face, similar to those used to estab-
lish monopolies or other market controlling combinations, it has been difficult
to determine whether an attempted change in market structure would benefit
consumers by lowering distribution costs or harm them by obstructing com-
petition.4 In addition, substantial policy considerations have been advanced
in opposition to any change which harms small competitors, even though the
harm they suffer might be attributed to their inability to improve their own
efficiency.6 To accommodate these goals-seeking greater efficiency, protecting
*General Foods Corp., FTC Dkt. 6018 (Feb. 15, 1956).
1. Higher costs of distribution would appear to be a natural concomitant of tech-
nological improvement and higher standards of life. Urbanization, specialization and desire
for variety seem to be the principal direct causes of these increased costs. TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND, DOES DisTRmuTIoN COST Too MUCH? 8-21, 292-97 (1939). Nor has dis-
tribution kept up with the technological advances which have occurred in production. Id.
at 123-26. For an account of a similar experience in England see HALL, DIsmUTRIVE
TRADING 16-29 (1949).
2. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE ANTITRUST LAWS 129, 204 (1955) (hereinafter cited ATr'Y GEN. REP.); HALL,
DisTRruTIVE TRADING 66-68, 106-10 (1949) ; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUIW, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 81-100.
3. See tet at notes 47-54 infra.
4. The principal methods used have involved integration, voluntary chains (associa-
tions of retailers formed to concentrate their buying power), and often discriminatory pric-
ing. See authorities cited note 2 supra. For discussion of the dual nature of integration,
see DIRLAm & KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION 141-50 (1954); see also note 12 infra. The
partly monopolistic character of voluntary chains is considered in HALL, DISTRIBUTIVE
TRADING 109-14 (1949). The various uses of price discrimination are treated in Machlup,
Characteristics and Types of Price Discrimination, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND
PRICE POLICY 397 (National Bureau of Economic Research ed. 1955). See also Rowe,
Price Discrimination, Competition and Confu sion, 60 YAX L.J. 929, 935-37 (1950).
5. The inability to meet competition is rarely admitted explicitly by the defenders of
small business, even though, since their arguments are not based on a claim of efficiency,
they would not necessarily be overturned by such an admission. In fact some of the meas-
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competitors, and preserving competition-Congress enacted the Robinson-
Patman Act, but instead of resolving these conflicts the act seems only to have
added questions concerning its meaning. 6
The problems engendered in establishing new methods of distribution are
exemplified by the present controversy over "functional discounts"-price dif-
ferentials granted by a seller as a result of the buyer's role in the distributive
process. Although their desirability had been much debated in Congress, the
Robinson-Patman Act made no specific mention of functional discounts, 7 and
its general provisions left their legality in doubt.8 The Federal Trade Com-
mission, however, soon found a place for what might be called the "status" or
"trade" type of functional discounts. 9 It allowed a seller to establish a separate
ures taken in support of smallness can be justified only by considering efficiency less im-
portant than smallness. TWENTIETH CEITURY FUND, op. cit. supra note 1, at 253 (dis-
cussing chain store taxes). For the arguments made in favor of the small dealer see
Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 765 (1947) (dissenting opinion);
Automatic Canteen v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 82 (1953) (dissenting opinion) ; Doubleday &
Co., CCH TRADE REG. REp. 1954-55 Transfer Binder 25634, at 35680 (FTC 1955) (con-
curring opinion); KAPLAN, SMALL BUSINESS: ITS PLACE AND PROBLEMS 2-7 (1948);
Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 69 (1956). For the view that efficient distribution is of paramount
importance even if it be realized at the risk of small competitors, see HALL, DISTRInUTIVE
TRADING 188-92 (1949) ; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, op. cit. supra note 1, at 343-46, 363.
6. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952). For different views on the history
of the act and what it tried to accomplish see, e.g., Freer, Introduction to Section 2, in
CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr SymaposiUM-1946, at 5 (1946) (to aid the "little man"
but also to promote competition); Adelman, The Consistency of the Robinson-Patman
Act, 6 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1953) (to inhibit competition and discriminate against low-cost
buyers-nothing but a re-enacted NRA); Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation:
Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 Mica. L. REv. 1139, 1199 (1952)
(to preserve competition generally, but also for protection of competitors) ; Ar'Y GEN.
REP. 129-31; Rowe, Price Differentials and Product Differentiation, 66 YALE LJ. 1, 2-3
nn.5, 6, 7, 34-36 nn.141, 142 (1956) and authorities cited therein. On the difficulties in as-
certaining the meaning of the law see Ruberoid Co. v. FTC, 189 F.2d 893, 894-95 (2d Cir.
1951) ; Ruberoid Co. v. FTC, 343 U.S. 470, 492 (1952) (dissenting opinion) ; Automatic
Canteen v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 65 (1953) (dictum). For the predictions made at the time
the act was passed, see authorities cited in Comment, 54 Micn. L. REv. 659, 668 n.42
(1956), and in Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition and Confusion, 60 YM L.J.
929,931,n.10 (1950).
7. The bill as originally passed by the Senate contained a provision allowing price
differentials based on the position of the buyer in the distributive hierarchy. 80 CoNG.
REc. 6428 (1936). As reported out of committee, the House bill had a similar provision
but distributive status was to depend on the nature of the selling of the party receiving
the discount. H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-9 (1936). Opposition by farm
groups who feared for the status of farm co-operatives under these provisions apparently
led to their removal. Comment, 54 MicH. L. REv. 659, 667 (1956); Shniderman, The
Tyranny of Labels, 60 HARV. L. REv. 571, 583-86 (1947).
8. Comment, 54 MicH. L. REv. 659, 667-68 (1956); Shniderman, The Tyranny of
Labels, 60 HARv. L. Rxv. 571, 580-87 (1947); Van Cise, Functional Prices, in CCH
ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr SYmaPosiUm-1947, at 89, 91 (1947); Note, 56 COLUm. L. REv.
626-27 (1956).
9. "Status" functional discounts are here used to refer to discounts given solely be-
cause of a distributor's position in the distributive hierarchy, his position being defined by
[Val. 066
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discount for each class of distributor buying from him, but a class was defined
to embrace all distributors who competed against each other in reselling the
discounted product. Thus, a vertically integrated wholesaler-retailer would be
eligible for only the retail discount, since despite his performance of both func-
tions he actually sold in competition with other retailers.' 0 These functional
discounts based on status were thought to be consistent with the act for two
reasons: they could not harm competition, since each distributor could receive
no more than the discount given his competitors; and, since they were not
explicitly forbidden by the act, they were permissible means of preserving tradi-
tional methods of distribution." Thus, apart from the fact that, as permitted,
status discounts themselves discouraged vertical integration of distributors as
a method of increasing efficiency,' 2 the rationale in allowing them revealed a
the market in which he sells. The term is distinguished from "service' type of functional
discounts, the size of which would depend on the services performed by the distributor
receiving the discount. See Kelley, Functional Discounts Under the Robinson-Patinan
Act, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 526 (1952); Van Cise, Functional Prices, in CCH ROBINSON-
PA ArAN Acr SymVposlat-1947, at 89, 89-90 (1947) ; Note, 67 HARv. L. REv. 294 (1953).
10. Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945), modified, 43 F.T.C. 56 (1946), aff'd, 173
F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949), rez'd on other grounds, 340 U.S. 231. (1951), reissued with new
findings, 49 F.T.C. 923 (1953), set aside, 233 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. filed, 25
U.S.L. WEEK 3107 (U.S. Oct. 28, 1956) (No. 465) ; Sherwin-Williams Co., 36 F.T.C. 25,
64-66, 73 (1943) (holding that a wholesaler's discount could be received on that part of
the produce sold at wholesale, but that merely taking the word of the jobber for the pro-
portion so re-sold was not sufficient) ; Albert L. Whiting, 26 F.T.C. 312 (1938) (illegal
to give greater discounts to one distributor than to others with whom he competed in sell-
ing). Such discounts, of course, might have been justified under one of the exceptions to
§ 2(a) of the act, such as the cost justification. But see note 19 infra. The rule that the
character of the selling was the significant factor, in part stemmed from the legislative
origin of the act, see note 7 supra, but in part antedated the Robinson-Patman Act, corn-
pare The Mennen Co., 4 F.T.C. 258 (1922), with Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 Fed. 774 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 759 (1923). In other cases it was established that equal prices
to those who did not sell on the same level in the distributive hierarchy were not discriri-
natory. Bird and Son, Inc., 25 F.T.C. 548, 552 (1937). But cf. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp.,
25 F.T.C. 537, 540 (1937) (suggesting that retailers purchasing directly from the producer
may actually be receiving discriminatory discounts, since other retailers, purchasing from
whole alers at a higher price, might nevertheless be purchasers from the producer within
the meaning of the act).
11. Doubleday & Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1954-55 Transfer Binder ff 25634, at
35678 (FTC 1955) ; Van Cise, Functional Prices, in CCH RoBINSON-PATMAN Acr Sym-
Posium-19
47, at 89, 92 (1947) (collecting cases). But see Kelley, Functional Discounts
Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 526, 530-32 (1952). Such discounts
were permitted under the old Clayton Act since there was no competition betweeli parties
receiving different discounts. 'Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 Fed. 774 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
262 U.S. 759 (1923); Baran v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 256 Fed. 571, 574 (S.D.N.Y.
1919). For historical accounts of the judicial treatment of functional discounts, see Com-
ments, 54 icm. L. REv. 659 (1956) ; 49 MICH. L. REv. 261 (1950).
12. Clearly all cost saving inducement to integration would be destroyed if a distrib-
utor who performed retail and wholesale functions were charged the same price as one
who performed merely retail functions. E.g., Arr'y GEN. REP. 207-09; Note, 67 HARv.
L. REv. 294 (1953) ; Adelman, The Consistency of the Robinson-Patman Act, 6 STAt. L.
1956]
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bias against any departure from traditional methods, however efficient such
innovation might be.
The recent case of General Foods illustrates both the continuing attempt to
improve upon traditional methods of distribution and the obstacles the Robin-
son-Patman Act may place in the path of innovation.1 3 General Foods had con-
tracted to distribute some of its products through numerous small Institutional
Contract Wagon Distributors (ICWD's) who admittedly competed against
conventional wholesalers for the feeding institution business. 14 General Foods
agreed to grant ICWD's a discount from its wholesale list price in exchange
for their undertaking to perform services not normally performed by whole-
salers.I' The importance in terms of increased sales and consumer satisfaction
REv. 3, 13 (1953). It does not follow, however, that integration for predatory purposes
would likewise be discouraged. Vertical integration may lead to lower costs and more
efficient production, Comment, 19 U. CHI. L. Rav. 583, 611 n.173 (1952). It has been at-
tacked, however, as a weapon in establishing a monopoly. DiRLAM & KAHN, FAIR Com-
PETTION 22-23 (1954). Classically, a producer or distributor will integrate if the costs of
the combined business plus implicit interest charges--i.e., the profit that would have been
earned had the capital been otherwise invested-are lower than the costs plus implicit in-
terest on the smaller capital base after paying an independent contractor to do part of the
work. See Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HAv. L. REv. 27, 33 (1949) ;
Moore, The Automobile Industry, in STucruRE OF AmEuCAN INDUsTRY 274, 297-99
(Adams rev. ed. 1954). In a fluctuating market, producers and middlemen may also in-
tegrate to stabilize their supply of essential materials or the demand for their products.
This, in the long run at least, also results in cost savings. See McIsaac, The Cotton Tex-
tile Industry, in STmucru n Or A-,RICAN INDuSTRY 47, 51-54 (Adams rev. ed. 1954).
On the other hand integration may be undertaken merely as a means of acquiring a
stranglehold on the market, either through control of a critical area of production or dis-
tribution or through the amassing of economic power. DlR.Ax & KAHN, FAIR COMPETI-
TION 141-50 (1954) ; Standard Oil v. United States, 221. U.S. 1 (1911) ; see also Dirlam,
The Petroleum Industry, in SraucrutE OF AmERIcAN INDusTRY 236, 266-69 (Adams rev.
ed. 1954). But see Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act, 22 U. CHI. L. Rv.
157, 194-201 (1954). While it is sometimes said that the cost advantages of integration
are only with difficulty separated from its more predatory uses, see, e.g., DnrLu. & KAHN,
FAro ComPFTxITox 151 (1954), a law which would hinder all integration would not appear
justified. Accordingly the Supreme Court has refused to hold integration illegal per se
under the Sherman Act. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 525 (1948) ;
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 174 (1948). For excellent treat-
ment of the problems and misconceptions arising from integration and the antitrust laws
see Bork, mspra (analyzing cases and destroying many arguments made against integration
as a weapon of monopoly); Comment, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 583 (1952) (collecting au-
thorities, analyzing cases, and examining the economics of integration). See also Kelley,
Functional Discounts Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 40 CALIF. L. Rav. 526, 529 (1952)
(cost justification defense under § 2(a) is more difficult for integrated distributors than
for independents, since "normal profits" are not allowed as a cost).
13. FTC Dkt. 6018 (Feb. 15, 1956), adopting Initial Decision (Mar. 22, 1955).
14. FTC decision at 3.
15. The contract provided that ICWD's should: sell aggressively, provide door to
store delivery, offer services offered by competitors, maintain adequate stocks, arrange to
move older stocks first, handle damaged merchandise in accord with General Foods policy,
distribute promotional materials, maintain replacement parts for coffee-making equipment,
[Vol. 66
HeinOnline -- 66 Yale L.J. 246 1956-1957
NOTES
of selling in the ICWD manner was not denied.' 6 Although the reasonableness
of the discounts was neither proved nor disproved, part of the Commission's
reasoning may justify an inference that they were not excessive.17 Neverthe-
less, the Federal Trade Commission held that the discounts were a violation
of section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, and that they were not within
any exceptions to section 2 (a) which section 2 (d), as interpreted, may create.' 8
Three years ago, the General Foods holding would have been no surprise.
It was generally thought at the time that service-type functional discounts
could be justified, if at all, only as promotional services under section 2(d). 19
arrange for proper displays of products in public feeding establishments, make deliveries,
for extra pay, on General Foods sales to multiple food operators. Id. at 2-3. See also
Initial Decision at 7-8.
16. Initial Decision at 8, 10.
17. In a separate count the government argued that General Foods' payments to
ICWD's for their delivering food sold directly by General Foods were so grossly excessive
that they constituted hidden discounts to the ICWD's as purchasers. Although delivery
was of course less valuable a service than sale and delivery, and the payments for delivery
alone were equal to, and in the case of coffee 50% more than, the payments for both, the
Commission affirmed the hearing examiner's finding that the payments were not grossly
excessive. Initial Decision at 14-16, adopted by FTC at 10.
18. FTC decision at 4-7.
19. Van Cise, Functional Prices, in CCH ROBINSON-PATmAN ACT Symposiu -
1947, at 89, 91 (1947); Note, 56 COLum. L. REv. 626, 627-28 (1956). This of course
assumes that they could not be justified under one of the specific exceptions to § 2(a) :
the cost justification, good faith meeting of competition, or the changing conditions de-
fenses. See Robinson-Patman Act, 49 STAT. 1526 § 2(a) (b) (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(b) (1952). Of these three only the cost justification defense could be generally applicable
as a way of saving functional discounts. It allows differentials "which make only due
allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the
differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or
delivered." Ibid. Thus the cost defense, if feasible, seems to protect service functional dis-
counts, EDWARDS, MAINTAINING CoMPETnIoN 161 (1949), but strict reading and the enor-
mous cost of preparing and presenting a cost defense, as well as the elusiveness of cost
data, have made this defense almost useless. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61,
68, 79 (1953) ; A T'y GEN. REP. 170-76 (collecting cases). See particularly the full dis-
cussion and compilation of authorities on the cost defense in Rowe, Price Differentials and
Product Differentiation, 66 YALE L.J. 1, 21-23 nn.91-100, 43-45 nn.168-73 (1956). For an
additional obstacle to a successful cost justification, see Kelley, Functional Discounts
Under the Robinson-Patinan Act, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 526, 528 (1-952) (seller's cost does
not include implicit interest charges on his investment; thus seller can not show that these
charges decrease when his purchaser, by backward vertical integration, undertakes greater
functions).
Although § 2(a) prohibitions apply only to price discriminations which may substan-
tially lessen competition, this limitation will currently shelter few service functional dis-
counts. The courts have held a price differential, at least among competitors, to be prima
facie evidence of lessening of competition, but this rule has not been followed consistently
and is currently subject to vigorous attack. For review of the many problems raised by
the lessening of competition doctrine and analysis of cases, see, e.g., A'T' Y GEN. Rm.
160-70 (1955) (attacking prima facie rule); Rowe, Borderland Issues in Court and Com-
missiog Cases Under Sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act, in ABA SEcrIox OF ANrTITUsr
L4w PaocEEnxas 60 (April 1956) (same).
19561
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But even this possible loophole offered virtually no hope. Traditionally pay-
ments for promotional services made under section 2(d) were limited by
several strict requirements: they could be made only for services not merely
contracted for, but actually performed: and each payment had to be reason-
ably related to the value of the service, determined by objective standards.?)
Clearly the services involved in General Foods could not qualify, and the Com-
mission so held. General Foods agreed to grant a discount in return for a
promise of services and, the Commission noted, did not police its contracts to
insure that the ICWD's performed.21 M1oreover, although some ICWD's ren-
dered greater services than others, all received the same discount; the pay-
ments, consequently, could not have been reasonably related to the services
performed, at least in a strict sense. More important, the services promised
were, by their nature, not susceptible of definite valuation.
22
Coming when it did, however, General Foods represented a significant de-
parture from the course the Federal Trade Commission had been expected to
follow. Recently the Commission seemed to have accepted the recommenda-
tion of the Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws: the legality of functional discounts should no longer be
based solely on the re-sale functions performed by a distributor, but as well
on the services-transportation and storage, for example-which the distrib-
utor renders.23 In the Doubleday case, the Commission, by a three to two
margin, admitted evidence proffered to show that discounts given to distribu-
tors who resold in the retail market were given as payment for services ren-
dered by them as jobbers.24 Although the FTC found that the payments were
in fact price reductions in violation of section 2 (a) and not payments for job-
bing services, 2 5 it not only admitted the evidence but also explicitly approved
the theory on which it was offered: differing discounts to competing distribu-
tors were not violations of section 2(a) if reasonably related to the value of
20. FTC decision at 5-6; Dunn, Section 2(d) and (e), in CCH ROBINSON-PATMA'N
AcT SYMPosium-1946, at 55, 65-66 (1946) : Lever Brothers Co., FTC Dkt. 5585 (1954) .
Procter & Gamble Distributing Co., FTC Dkt. 5586 (1954) ; Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co.,
FTC Dkt. 5587 (1954). The above opinions are digested in 1 CCH TRADE REG. REI'.
f111 3522.530,3522.650.
21. FTC decision at 6.
22. Ibid.
23. See Doubleday & Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1954-55 Transfer Binder 256,34
(FTC 1955) (relying heavily on the very language in ATr'v GEN. REP. at 202-08). The
report in turn attempts to rely on the "mandate," given by various Supreme Ciiurt
opinions, to recognize actual marketing functions "rather than ambiguous labels." Ar'v
GEN. REP. 208-09 (citing FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 475 (1952) ; Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 615 (1953) ; United States v. Masonite
Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 280 (1942) ; FTC v. Motion Pictures Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S.
392, 397 (1953) ; Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 236 n.4 (1951)).
For indications of the significance ascribed to Doubleday, see, e.g., Comment, 54 MICH.
L. Rav. 659, 673-80 (1956) ; Note, 56 Co.u. L. REv. 626 (1956).
24. Doubleday & Co.. supra note 23, at 35678.
25. Id. at 35679.
[Vol. 66
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those distributive functions actually performed by them.26 Thus, in a major
turnabout, the Commission clearly indicated that to a "status" theory of func-
tional discounts had been added a "payment for services performed" or "func-
tional" theory, and that service-type functional discounts could be granted pro-
tection under the Robinson-Patman Act without being justified under one of
the explicit exceptions to section 2(a).27
Commentators have disagreed on the impact of General Foods on Double-
da y. In General Foods the defendant attempted to meet the charge of a sec-
tion 2(a) violation by justifying the discounts under section 2(d) .29 The FTC
rejected the defense, stating that section 2(d) requirements had not been met
and that the discounts were not of a character generally covered by section
2(d)."" The Commission then considered, separately, whether General Foods
had made proper payments for functional discounts under section 2(a) ; on
this issue as well it found against the defendant, stating that the discounts must
accord with the "terms and conditions" of section 2(d) .31
On this latter issue, the two cases can be reconciled. In both cases, the FTC
was willing to consider the possibility that service-type functional discounts
might be legal under section 2(a). In Doubleday, the Commission listed cer-
26. Id. at 35677-78. Two of the commissioners rejected the majority rationale in
concurring opinions. Commissioner Mead, apparently unconvinced by the authorities
gathered by the Report of the Attorney General's Committee, see note 23 supra, noted:
"whether or not this is good economics, I am not prepared to say .... [I]t is not the law
as expressed in the Robinson-Patman Act." Doubleday & Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP.
1954-55 Transfer Binder 1 25634, at 35680 (FTC 1955).
27. Comment, 54 MIcn. L. REv. 659, 678 (1956); Note, 56 COLUM. L. Rxv. 626
(1956) ; Rowe, Borderland Issues in Court and Commission Cases Under Sections 2 and
3 of the Clayton Act, in ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW PROCEEDINGS 60 (April 1956).
In adopting this theory the Commission noted certain requirements including a reasonable
relation between the amounts of the discounts and the services furnished, Doubleday &
Co., supra note 26, at 35678; and probably, according to one commentator, that the dis-
counts must be made available on equal terms to all, Note, 56 COLUm. L. REv. 626, 629
(1956). The latter is probably a reasonable restriction. See text at note 58 infra. If the
reasonable relation rule is interpreted to require comparison of the discount with an exact
valuation of the service, the seller would probably need to establish a causal relationship
between an increase in his profit and the distributor's service. This "profit justification"
would pose the same obstacles to service functional discounts as the cost justification de-
fense, see note 19 supra.
28. Comment, 54 MIcH. L. REv. 659, 678 n.75a (1956) (Genteral Foods is perfectly
consistent with Doubleday, since General Foods did not insure that the ICWD's actually
rendered the services promised) ; Rowe, Borderland Issues in Court and Commission
Cases Under Sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act, in ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW
PROCEEDINGS 60 (April 1956) (General Foods "obliterates all trace of the Doubleday de-
cision").
29. FTC decision at 4,6.
30. Id. at 4-6. In holding that these could not be § 2(d) payments the Commission
also cited Champion Spark Plug Co., FTC Dkt. 3977 (1953), opinion digested I CCH
T'R"E RxE. REP. II 3522.360, which held that § 2(d) covered only payments, not discounts.
31. FTC decision at 6-7.
HeinOnline -- 66 Yale L.J. 249 1956-1957
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
tain requirements which service-type functional discounts would have to meet;
these standards resemble some traditional section 2(d) requirements.32 By
reading the section 2 (d) "terms and conditions" into the 2 (a) context, the FTC
in General Foods may have meant to overrule Doubleday. But if the Commis-
sion meant only those conditions it had stated in Doubleday, the cases are con-
sistent. If the Commission meant either all section 2(d) requirements or more
than were listed in Doubleday--including the prerequisite that discounts be
offered to competitors on "proportionally equal" terms-the cases can still be
reconciled. Doubleday involved traditional distribution services; General
Foods involved entirely new distributive methods. 3 The FTC then may have
indicated it would adhere to stricter standards for new methods. 34 In addition,
it may have felt that the requirements of section 2(d) incorporated into sec-
tion 2(a) could be met in Doubleday, but not in General Foods. For example,
if it can be inferred that the prohibition against services of uncertain value is
picked up by section 2(a), the Doubleday services must be deemed more sus-
ceptible of objective valuation than the General Foods services because Double-
day services were the same as those traditionally performed by the independent
wholesalers, jobbers and retailers long protected under section 2(a). 35 And
the same reasoning can be applied to other section 2(d) requirements which
depend at least in part upon an acceptable valuation-actual performance of
the services and a reasonable relationship between performance and payment.30
32. Doubleday & Co., CCH TaADE REC. REP. 1954-55 Transfer Binder 1 25634, at
35678 (FTC 1955) (implying that in some form the "reasonable relation" and "actual
performance' tests would have to be met). There was no direct mention, however, of a
requirement of an exact price tag or that the payments must be offered on "proportionally
equal" terms to all. More important, perhaps, there was no indication that such require-
ments would be interpreted in their strict, technical § 2(d) meaning.
33. Doubleday & Co., supra note 32, at 35677-78. The discounts in Doubleday, unlike
those in General Foods, were for services by integrated distributors. In particular, the
services which the recipients of discounts in Doubleday were said to have performed were
merely those resulting from the union of the traditional jobbing and wholesaling functions
in the book industry. Ibid. In General Foods, on the other hand, the services performed
were entirely new, and did not merely constitute the performance of the services of two
previous classes by one new class. FTC decision at 2.
34. I.e., when traditional services are performed, though by integrated distributors, a
proper service functional discount can be granted, but when new services are performed
the payments are ruled by § 2(d).
35. This fact, however, does not of itself make the Doubleday services easier to value.
It is not at all clear that all integrated jobbers would perform their functions in the same
way or to the same extent. Nor could the benefit of such services to the seller be given a
simple price tag. Had this been so, the cost justification would have been a more valuable
defense in pre-Doubleday situations than it in fact was. See notes 19, 27 suipra. Thus the
only way in which Doubleday services could be valued more easily than General Foods
services would be by analogy with the price of these same services when performed by
independents.
36. Actual performance could well be interpreted to mean that each distributor must
give full value for the discounts paid him. In addition, since unperformed promises will
not justify discounts, FTC decision at 5-6, the requirement that the discount must be re-
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The conclusion that Doubleday was not overruled derives support from the
fact that the General Foods opinion was written by a member of the Double-
day majority, Chairman Gwynne, and the only other member of that majority
who sat on both cases, Commissioner Mason, did not dissentY3 Thus the
Commission may have chosen a middle course. It may still be willing, as in
Doubleday, to consider service-type functional discounts as having a separate
status under section 2(a) of the act but since service-type functional discounts
are not specifically exempted from the prohibitions of section 2(a), the Com-
mission will accord them protected status only if they meet strict standards
derived from section 2(d). Applying section 2(d)'s standards, as construed
in General Foods, however, has one clear result: payments for services which
traditionally were performed by wholesalers, retailers or other established
classes of distributors are strongly preferred over payments for new services.
Although the result in General Foods may protect independent wholesalers
from new methods of distribution, it has serious disadvantages in terms both
of protecting consumers and of promoting competition among producers. It
might be argued, that those institutional users who buy from conventional
wholesalers and the ICWD's, should be free to choose between buying both
food and the ICWD service and buying the food alone at a lower price, for
only this free market action can demonstrate whether the ICWD innovation
is desirable.2 8 This argument has little validity. It assumes that General Foods
could either cut its prices generally, allowing the ICWD's to sell their services
with the product at the list price before the cut: or maintain the current price,
giving consumers an option to buy ICWD services for an additional considera-
tion. However, a general price cut is seldom feasible in oligopolistic situations.89
lated to the service really means reasonably related to the value of the performance, and
value, again, may mean value objectively determined, see note 27 supra.
37. FTC decision at 1; Doubleday & Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1954-55 Transfer
Binder 11 25634, at 35676 (FTC 1955). That Doubleday was not overruled is further in-
dicated by the Commission's last statement under this count "to hold that the rendering
of special services ipso facto gives him a special functional classification would be to read
Section 2(d) out of the Act." FTC decision at 7. The use of the words "ipso facto"
implies that special services of a particular kind, or which meet some of the requirements
of § 2(d), could still be in a protected status. That the position taken in Doubleday was
in fact the majority view, despite Commissioner Gwynne's ambiguous concurrence, is seen
at Doubleday & Co., supra at 35676, and in Commissioner Mead's concurrence where it is
expressly termed "the position of the Majority," id. at 35680.
38. See Initial Decision at 11.
39. Galbraith, Monopoly and the Concentration of Economic Power, in 1 AMt. EcON.
Ass'N, A SURVEY OF CONTEMPORARY EcoNo ics 113 (Ellis ed. 1949) ; Rothschild, Price
Theory andi Oligopoly, 57 EcoN. J. 299 (1947), reprinted in Am. EcoN. Ass'WN, READiNGs
IN PvicE THEoRY 440, 455-57 (1953) ; Sweezy, Demand Under Conditions of Oligopoly,
47 J. POL. EcoN. 568 (1939), reprinted in id. at 404, 408; see also FELLNER, CoMPETITor
AMtoNG THE FEw 182-83 (1949) (price cut likely only if oligopolist either desires to test
opponent's strength or desires a price war); Rowe, Price Differentials and Product
Differentiation, 66 YALE L.J. 1, 31-32 (1956). But see Stigler, The Kinky Oligopoly
Demand Curve and Rigid Prices, 55 J. PoL EcoN. 432 (1947).
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Were General Foods to offer its food at a lower price to its consumers, its
competitors would probably follow, and might even take General Foods' cut
to be a signal for a price war and undercut.40 In many cases the demand for
the products of the industry as a whole will not be sufficiently elastic to enable
General Foods to profit by a price cut which is matched; in any event, the fear
that a price war will follow nearly always outweighs this limited hope of
profit.41 And even if price cuts were feasible, only General Foods was in a
position to, and apparently did, foresee the cost reduction advantages of the
new service. For even after a price cut consumers would assumedly be offered
the service at a price sufficiently above the price of the goods alone to cover
the high initial cost of offering the service. Under such circumstances there is
no reason to assume that consumers would purchase the new service in suffi-
cient quantity to permit any economies of scale in the service itself.42 A con-
sumer option to pay for the new service plus the current price for General
Foods' products would have the same defect. In addition, since consumers
would have to pay more for the product-service combination, the option plan
would be less likely to induce greater sales and realize the lower production
costs of increased output. And because any efficiencies from greater output
that might result would inure only to General Foods, the consumer would re-
ceive none of the benefits of these efficiencies. In contrast, under the plan struck
down in General Foods, the consumer was actually receiving the services with-
out any increase in price.
43
The effect of General Foods is to hinder an effective and desirable method
of competition which is, indeed, often the only one available to producers.
40. FELLNE , op. cit. supra note 39, at 182; Rothschild, supra note 39, at 457; Sweezy,
supra note 39, at 405.
41. See Rowe, Price Differentials and Product Differentiation, 66 YALE L.J. 1, 32
(1956). In a recent series of essays on various American industries all of the authors
who considered the elasticity of demand for their industry found either that the industry
demand was inelastic or that members of the industry were strongly convinced it was in-
elastic. In one case an estimate of elasticity indicated it might be slightly greater than
one, but neither the industry nor the author thought this was elastic enough to warrant a
price cut. ADAmS, STRUCTUR OF AMERICAN IN-DUsTRy 20-21 (agriculture), 308-09 (auto-
mobiles), 212-13 (chemical), 336-38 (cigarettes), 254 (petroleum), 175-77 (steel) (rev.
ed. 1954). See also Rothschild, supra note 39, at 460 (oligopolists always consider possi-
bility of price war when making decisions) ; FELLNER, op. cit. supra note 39, at 179, 182
(desire to avoid cutthroat competition causes deviations from course which would maxi-
mize the joint profits of the industry).
42. In many cases the cost of services will be less than their value to purchasers only
if they are sold in volume. Thus they can be offered only if General Foods is permitted
to bear part of their cost until sufficient demand is developed. Evergreen Amusement Corp.
v. Milstead, 206 Md. 610, 621, 112 A.2d 901, 906 (1955) (admitting the need for time in
which to develop demand). SA.suELsox, Ecoxomilcs 393-94 & n.1 (3d ed. 1955) (dis-
cussing reversible and irreversible economies of scale, both internal and external to the
firm).
43. Since few new services will be popular enough to establish themselves at the
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Since the price in an oligopolistic market structure, a highly common situation
in our economy,44 is a resultant of an unspoken compromise of the policies and
desires of the several members of the industry,45 a single producer may find
that the quantity he can sell at this price is less than the quantity which would
maximize his profit.40 Apart from openly cutting prices, a step he fears to
take,47 the producer can increase his sales by: A, product differentiation or
improvement; B, hidden, and since hidden usually discriminatory, price cuts;
and C, payments for services, often new services, offered, as in General Foods.4a
relatively high initial cost, producers who desire to increase output will often be the only
ones willing to bear part of their cost, and thus in effect give a price cut, when no one
would be willing to bear the risk of offering the service at cost. And even if the service
were successfully offered at cost, the consumers will have received no benefit from any in-
crease in output which resulted. Compare this with H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. 17 (1936), which noted that there is nothing in the Robinson-Patman Act which
hinders efficiency and economies and that the act in no way infringes the seller's freedom
to pass the benefits of such economies on to those with whom he deals. For reasons why
General Foods might desire increased output even if it had to bear the costs of added ser-
vice see text at notes 46-48 infra.
44. FELLNER, op. cit. supra note 39, at 18-23 (not universal, but very frequent, particu-
larly in manufacturing) ; Galbraith, supra note 39, at 101, 127 (dominant market form in
our economy).
45. FELLNER, op. cit. supra note 39, at c. I, 175-82 (defining the quasi-agreement in
oligopoly and discussing its effect on oligopolistic pricing); see Rothschild, supra note
39, at 452-57.
46. See note 48 infra.
47. See notes 39, 41 supra. This assumes that he is not in so desperate a situation
that even a price war appears desirable to him.
48. For a treatment of the type of competitive moves likely in an oligopoly situation,
see FELLNER, op. cit. supra note 39, at 183-91 (many dynamic changes are still possible in
oligopolies) ; Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 Am. EcoN. REv.
241, 253 (1940) (on the existence of discriminatory "price chiselling" in oligopoly). In
oligopoly the producer cannot base his price solely on cost and demand considerations, see
authorities cited note 45 supra; indeed he has no demand function in the classical economic
sense, see FELLNER, op. cit. supra note 39, at 3-15. Moreover, since he represents a sub-
stantial portion of the industry, and, ceteris paribus, the quantity sold by the industry de-
pends on price, the individual producer cannot vary his own sales at the given price unless
he uses one or more of the methods outlined in the text. Lacking full control of either
price or output, he may not therefore be producing at the output which would maximize
his profits. He then has a strong incentive to vary his output by using the methods out-
lined in the text, all of which may be equivalent to a price cut. This ipcentive may exist
even though competitors would immediately follow, at least if the industry demand curve
were elastic. In that case, industry revenues would be increased by the equivalent of a
price cut which was, itself, unfeasible. The incentive may of course be heightened by the
normal desire, present in other market structures, to achieve through advertising and
services a constantly increasing demand for the industry products.
In pure competition, the producer cannot control price; forming an infinitely small part
of the market, he can, however, sell whatever he wishes at the existing price. He will,
therefore, regulate his output so that he produces at the profit-maximizing point. CHAM-
BERLIN,, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 16-21 (6th ed. 1951). His only in-
centive for undertaking one of the methods listed in text would be to differentiate his
product and become an imperfect competitor. In pure monopoly the producer has control
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All these, even when discriminatory, are in effect sparks of competition in a
generally noncompetitive area.4 9 The current interpretation of the Robinson-
Patman Act seriously impedes method A. 50 Moreover, from the standpoint of
the consumer, it is questionable whether A is preferable to the method adopted
by General Foods.51 Method B, while at times urged by economists, is not
only illegal but dangerous because it is often impossible to tell if hidden price
cuts are used for competitive or predatory reasons. 2 Method C may, in some
cases, be less desirable than an open price cut,5 3 but C is the closest approach
to an open price cut an oligopolistic quasi-agreement will permit; and C is
permitted because, unlike a price cut, its danger to the industry is limited and,
more important, it is often essential to a method of competition popular with
oligopolists-innovation. 54 It may be true that the competition engendered by
of either price or output and may, therefore, always choose to produce at the profit mad-
mization level. BOULDING, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 523-33 (rev. ed. 1948). Hence, his only
incentive for using the methods in text is a desire to shift the industry demand curve out-
ward.
In monopolistic competition, the producer may also control either the price or the out-
put of his product, and will produce at a point which maximizes his profits. Because of
the large number of close competitors, however, he is likely to remain with excess capacity.
He would then, more strongly than the monopolist, be motivated to shift his demand curve
outward. CHAMBERLIN, op. cit. supra at 70-100. But see Harrod, Theory of Impcrfect
Competition Revised, in EcoNoMIC EssAYs 139 (1952) (arguing that such excess capacity
equilibrium is unlikely).
49. Authorities cited note 48 supra; EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 167-68
(1949).
50. For a thorough treatment of this problem see Rowe, Price Differentials and
Product Differentiation, 66 YALE L.J. 1 (1956).
51. When product differentiation takes the form of genuine differences in product-in
which case it is very similar in effect to method C-it gives more to the consumer for the
same amount of money. Rowe, Price Differentials and Product Differentiation, 66 YALE
L.J. 1, 32-33 (1956). On the other hand, when it merely represents a difference in label,
sold by much advertising, it is of doubtful value to the consumer. Brown, Advertising and
the Public Interest, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1167-84 (1948). See also A7r'y GEN. REP. 157-
58, 330-31 (discussing, not altogether unfavorably, product differentiation).
52. EDwARDs, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 167-68 (1949) (suggesting that antipathy
to competition in these areas usually takes the form of trying to prevent secret price con-
cessions) ; Clark, supra note 48, at 253 (describing price chiselling as more competitive
than fixed prices, and more workable than unlimited market chaos) ; Machlup, Charac-
teristics and Types of Price Discrimination, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE
POLICY 423-25. (National Bureau of Economic Research ed. 1955) (considering the diffi-
culty in distinguishing the purposes of discriminatory pricing).
53. See text at notes 38-42 supra. Of course the consumers may be economically
irrational; they may buy more of a given product if the service is offered "free" than
when the product is sold at a price sufficiently low to enable the service to be bought at
the same total cost. Another strong argument then exists for allowing the producer to
bear the cost of the service whether a price cut is feasible or not.
54. FELLNER, op. cit. supra note 39, at 183-91 (noting that competition is often tacitly
allowed in those variables, related closely to inventiveness, because of their limited danger,
and because of the need to find outlets for changes in relative strength of the competing
producers. A very mature, or cartellized, oligopoly might of course not even allow this
much competition).
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introducing such "free services" is insufficient, and that all oligopolistic market
structures should be condemned.5 Still, striking at whatever sparks of com-
petition exist and leaving the evil, if such it is,56 untouched is surely no an-
swer,5 7 especially since competition at the distributor level can be protected
from the potentially discriminatory nature of such "free services."
Incorporating some of section 2(d)'s safeguards into section 2(a) will in-
sure that no producer uses service functional discounts to prefer his favored
purchasers over their competitors. A producer should be required to offer his
functional discount to all competing distributors who are able and willing to
perform the service for which the discount is given, at least after the service
has been developed and tested.58 The producer should also be required to
police his contracts to assure himself that each distributor substantially per-
forms. And the discounts should be held invalid if it appears that they are not
reasonably related to the value of the services or that the producer in fact did
not attempt to fix their value in good faith. By these safeguards, distributors
will be protected from bogus services and other unfair preferences.5 9
Applying all of section 2(d)'s requirements, as construed in prior cases,
can be justified only by a desire to insulate distributors from the challenge of
new methods of distribution. These requirements would invalidate nearly all
service functional discounts, and certainly all those offered for new services. If
a producer is required to grant functional discounts to distributors who can
perform new and valuable services and equally to those who cannot perform,
he is hardly likely to adopt a method of distribution, however efficient, based
on that service. 0 And to require that the producer determine the exact degree
55. National Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F.2d 825, 834 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. granted,
FTC v. National Lead Co., 351 U.S. 961 (1956), cert. denied, National Lead Co. v. FTC,
351 U.S. 964 (1956) (existence of other forms of competition does not justify lack of price
competition) ; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220 (1940) (same).
See also American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (often interpreted
as implying the illegality of oligopoly as a market structure).
56. For a defense of oligopolies see ScHUmPET-R, CAPirTALS s, SocrxAsM, AND
Dri xocRAc" 81-106 (2d ed. 1947). For a middle of the road analysis see FIu. m , op.
cit. supra note 39, at 282-311.
57. Dnum^ & KAHN, FAr Co'p nTIoN 204-05 (1954); EDWARDS, MAINTAINING
ComPrioN 167-68 (1949) ; Clark, supra note 48, at 242, 253.
58. A manufacturer should not be forced to give up a tried system of distribution for
a system which could give no assurance of success.
59. It is often stated that this was the only aim of § 2(d) and that it should be nar-
rowly construed. See, e.g., Rowe, Price Differentials and Product Differentiation, 66
YALE L.J. 1, 25-26 n.112 (1956). But see id. at 26 n.114 (discussing the FTC's recent in-
crease in activity under §§ 2(d), (e)).
60. Yet in construing § 2(d) in General Foods the Commission said "The services for
which payment may be made under § 2(d) must be of such a character that they can
be made available on proportionally equal terms to all customers." FTC decision at 5.
Similarly in Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132, 133 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 806 (1947), it was held to be a violation of § 2(e), which uses language similar
to § 2(d), for Elizabeth Arden to offer demonstrator services tailored in such a way that
only few customers who sold prestige products could qualify for it. The court further
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to which each distributor performs and then pro rate his discount accordingly
would impose an oppressive administrative burden. Moreover, the section
2(d) requirement, announced in General Foods, that the service must be one
on which an exact price tag can be put 61 would invalidate all new services;
and many old services will be similarly excluded unless their value when per-
formed by new classes of distributors can be determined by analogy to their
value when performed by traditional classes.
62
The Federal Trade Commission and the courts should not interpret General
Foods as overruling Doubleday, for only by reconciling the two cases can ver-
tical integration among distributors be encouraged where it promotes efficiency.
The middle ground, granting service functional discounts a protected status
under section 2(a) provided some of the conditions of section 2(d) are met,
is in itself sound. However, the prohibitions of section 2(d) should not be
rigidly adhered to in applying the General Foods holding to future 2(a) cases
involving genuine innovations in distribution. 6 3 Construed as suggested, the
sanctions of the Robinson-Patman Act will guard against unfair preferences
without hampering competition among oligopolistic producers or impeding
the development of more efficient methods of distribution.
ruled that the seller must furnish the service, if at all, so proportioned and under such
terms that all competing purchasers might receive it. Id. at 135 & n.6. In Elizabeth Arden
Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988, 994-95 (8th Cir.), cert. denicd, 326 U.S. 773
(1945), the court granted treble damages under §§ 2(d), (e) where furnishing demon-
strators, or paying their salaries, depended on individual negotiation and was not on a propor-
tionally equal basis. The court cited with approval the FTC to the effect that "the furnish-
ing of a service or facility which cannot be proportionalized for the benefit of competing
purchasers... constitutes a failure to accord such services or facilities upon proportionally
equal terms." See also Dunn, Section 2(d) and (e), in CCH RoBiNSON-PATmtAN Acr
SvmIposium-1946, at 55, 68-70 (1946) (accepting this strict reading of the rule of § 2(d)
and § 2(e)); Montague, "Proportionally Equal Ternm" in CCH ROBINSON-PAMAN ACT
SymPosium-1948, at 51 (1948) (same). But see Lever Brothers Co., FTC Dkt. 5585
(1954) (holding no violation merely because purchasers of smaller quantities cannot avail
themselves of higher payments offered for newspaper advertising, since no favoritism was
shown and all knew about the plans) ; Procter & Gamble Distributing Co., FTC Dkt. 5586
(1954) (same); Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., FTC Dkt. 5587 (1954) (same) ; FTC Trade
Practice Conference Rules for the Cosmetics Industry, 3 CCH TRAE REG. REP. ff 20221
(1951).
61. FTC decision at 5. But cf. Lever Brothers Co., FTC Dkt. 5585 (1954) (requiring
merely that ,payments be made in good faith for services actually rendered and that a fair
and reasonable relation exist between the amount of payment and the type of service ren-
dered); Procter & Gamble Distributing Co., FTC Dkt. 5586 (1954) (same); Colgate-
Palmolive-Peet Co., FTC Dkt. 5587 (1954) (same).
62. See notes 35,36 supra.
63. In General Foods the fact that a different method of distribution was involved
was generally admitted. FTC decision at 6. The special status of ICWD's had, moreover,
been recognized by the OPS in its determination of price ceilings. Initial Decision at 10.
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